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Abstract  
Unpronounceable strings of 4 consonants (conditioned stimuli: CSs) were consistently 
followed by familiar words belonging to one of two opposed semantic categories 
(unconditioned stimuli: USs).  Conditioning, in the form of greater accuracy in rapidly 
classifying USs into their categories, was found when visually imperceptible (to most 
subjects) CSs occupied ≥ 58 ms of a 75-ms CS–US interval.  When clearly visible CSs 
were presented in a 375 ms CS–US interval, conditioning was strongly correlated with 
measures of contingency awareness, and did not occur in the absence of that awareness.  
These experiments delineated two forms of conditioning:  Unconscious conditioning 
occurred with a brief CS–US interval, with an effectively masked CS, and with no 
reportable knowledge of the contingent CS–US relation.  Conscious conditioning 
occurred with a substantially longer CS–US interval, a perceptible CS, and with subjects’ 
reportable knowledge of the contingent CS–US relation.   
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 Conditioning involves a change in behavior due to the pairing of a conditioned stimulus (CS) 
with an unconditioned stimulus (US).  Because conditioning has been demonstrated in organisms 
with nervous systems much less complex than those of the original mammalian subjects of 
conditioning research (e.g., Thompson & McConnell, 1955), occurrence of conditioning in the 
absence of conscious cognition has not been at issue—for non-human subjects.  The possibility 
of unconscious conditioning in human subjects was assumed by early researchers on human 
conditioning (Razran, 1955).  In more recent years, however, this possibility has been forcefully 
contested (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Shanks, 2010; Vadillo, Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2016; 
Weidemann, Satkunarajah, & Lovibond, 2016).  
 Rejection of unconscious human conditioning has recently taken three forms:  First, claimed 
conditioning effects have been asserted to be non-associative artifacts of procedures other than 
CS–US pairings, such as sensitization either to the CS or the US stimuli (Lovibond & Shanks, 
2002).  Second, published unconscious conditioning findings have been reported to fail in 
independent replications (e.g., Hendrickx, De Houwer, Baeyens, Eelen, & Van Avermaet, 1997).  
And third, claimed evidence for conditioning in the absence of contingency awareness has been 
argued to be an artifactual consequence of methodologically or conceptually weak procedures in 
measuring contingency awareness (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Vadillo et al, 20116; Shanks & 
St. John, 1994).1   
 This article reports findings that overcome these three empirical critiques.  Additionally, the 
present findings that show unconscious conditioning are accompanied by findings of conscious 
                                                 
1 Similar criticisms have been offered also for other unconscious learning paradigms—including artificial grammar 
learning (Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; A. S, Reber, 1967; R. Reber & Perruchet, 2003), operant learning 
(Dulany, 1961; Krasner, 1958; Mastropasqua & Turatto, 2015; Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Gast, 2016), and 
perceptual learning (Seitz & Watanabe, 2005, 2008).   
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conditioning effects that have properties clearly distinct from those found here for unconscious 
conditioning. 
 Studies of human eyeblink conditioning (Clark & Squire, 1998; Clark, Mann, & Squire, 
2002) have described distinct conscious (“declarative”) and non-conscious (“non-declarative”) 
conditioning processes that are assumed, respectively, to involve propositional and associative 
mental processes.  Critics of such two-process views of human conditioning (Lovibond & 
Shanks, 2002; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) claim that successful conditioning 
requires both a propositional representation of the CS–US contingency and conscious awareness 
of that contingency.  A recent review (Mitchell,  et al., 2009) appropriately observed that “a 
demonstration of unaware conditioning would be highly damaging to the propositional approach, 
and would provide strong evidence for a second (automatic) learning mechanism”.   
 Seeking to resolve debates about theoretical understanding of conditioning, this research 
applied methods that helped to resolve an earlier contentious debate about the necessity for 
conscious cognition in unconscious (“subliminal”) priming.  Priming most often involves the 
effect of a first (prime) stimulus on the response to a second (target) stimulus.  Conversely, 
conditioning most often involves the effect of a second (US) stimulus on the response to a first 
(CS) stimulus.  In the early 1980s, several researchers (Balota, 1983; Fowler, Slade, & Tassinary, 
1981; Marcel, 1983) reported that visually obscured words (“masked primes”) were cognitively 
processed outside of conscious awareness.  Evidence was offered in the form of these primes’ 
effects on speed and/or accuracy of rapid classification responses to immediately following 
visible targets.  When the masked prime and the immediately following target (word) were 
semantically related, classification responses to targets were found to be faster and/or more 
accurate than when there was no semantic relation. 
Greenwald & De Houwer: Conscious and Unconscious Conditioning 16 August 2017 - 5 - 
 The conclusion that these subliminal priming experiments established an unconscious form 
of cognitive processing was vigorously contested (Holender, 1986) on grounds that the 
supporting experiments had not adequately demonstrated that masked primes were processed 
without conscious awareness.  Methods introduced in the 1990s eventually succeeded in 
demonstrating that unconscious priming could occur not only in the absence of awareness of the 
masked primes, but even when their conscious visibility was reduced to zero (Greenwald, 
Klinger, & Schuh, 1995; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996; Draine & Greenwald, 1998).  
Unconscious (or subliminal, or masked) priming subsequently became a widely—even if not 
universally—accepted empirical phenomenon. 
 The research reported in this article started when, in 2006, the first author (AGG) suspected 
human conditioning could be investigated using methods that had previously been used to 
investigate subliminal priming.   The research proceeded without collaborator until 2010, when 
AGG’s and JDH’s encounter at a conference provided occasion for AGG to tell JDH about the 
research already conducted.  JDH’s published skepticism regarding unconscious conditioning 
(Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) prompted AGG to invite JDH to collaborate.  In turn, 
JDH made clear that willingness to be an eventual co-author would require being able to 
replicate unconscious conditioning with human subjects in the Ghent University laboratory.  
That happened in 2013.  In 2013 and 2014, further collaborative research on conscious 
conditioning proceeded, using procedures differing from the unconscious conditioning 
experiments by extending the duration of the CS—to make it easily visible. 
 This article reports two series of studies, one on unconscious conditioning (Series 1) and one 
on conscious conditioning (Series 2). All studies started with a conditioning phase during which 
a prime stimulus (CS) preceded a target stimulus (US) on each trial. Subjects were asked to 
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categorize the target stimuli (as positive or negative words or as male or female names). The CSs 
were meaningless letter strings that were followed consistently by US stimuli from one category 
(e.g., one CS letter-string was always be followed by positive words whereas another CS letter-
string was always followed by negative words). A subsequent conditioning test phase presented 
trials that ended the contingency that characterized the conditioning phase. For instance, a CS 
letter-string that was always followed by a positive word during conditioning could be followed 
also by a negative word during test. Learning was indexed by the difference in performance on 
contingency-consistent test trials versus contingency-inconsistent test trials. In the 14 
experiments of Series 1, CS letter-strings were presented masked to greatly reduce their 
visibility. After the test phase, a visibility test was used to confirm effectiveness of this masking. 
Because visibility of the CS is a prerequisite of awareness of the CS-US contingency, the studies 
of Series 1 served to investigate unconscious conditioning. In the six studies of Series 2, CS 
letter-strings were easily identifiable, allowing examination of conscious conditioning. 
 All of the Series 1 studies used the following four elements of method from studies on 
subliminal priming: (a) a response window method that, by obliging very rapid responding, 
magnified effects of visually masked prime stimuli on responses to immediately subsequent 
target stimuli, (b) a “sandwich” visual masking procedure that used both forward and backward 
pattern masks to reduce visibility of prime stimuli, (c) extensive forced-choice testing to 
document visibility of masked primes, and (d) a statistical regression intercept method 
(Greenwald et al., 1995; Klauer, Greenwald, & Draine, 1998) that allowed estimation of the 
magnitude of priming associated with zero visibility of masked primes.  Because of the large 
number of studies reported in this article, presentation of all results is preceded by a general 
method section, which describes the main communalities and differences among the Series 1 
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experiments. The main difference of method in the Series 2 experiments was lengthening of the 
CS-US interval, to afford visibility of the CS.  
General Methods  
Subjects and Criteria for Retaining Data for Statistical Analysis 
 Except for one experiment conducted at Ghent University, subjects in all experiments were 
undergraduate students at University of Washington whose participation partially fulfilled a 
requirement of their introductory psychology course.  Reported analyses are based on samples 
that, for all experiments, were reduced by applying criteria used in all experiments to identify 
subjects who inadequately adhered to task instructions.  “Inadequate adherence” included (a) 
responding too rapidly or too slowly for the response window procedure to be useful2, (b) rates 
of response alternation (or its complement, response repetition) that varied by 2.5 SD or more 
from the expected 50% rates for either conditioning or visibility tests, or (c) responding on one 
of the two response keys at a proportion more than 2.5 SD deviant from the expected 50% rate.  
These nonadherences could have been due to inattention to instructions or to deliberate non-
compliance—a strategy some subjects may have used to shorten the experimental session.  These 
criteria eliminated approximately 10% of subjects per experiment.  The total numbers of subjects 
before and after exclusions are shown in Appendix Table A2.  The non-adherence criteria were 
ones used in previous subliminal priming experiments having procedures similar to those used in 
the present research.  Analyses that retained the excluded subjects invariably revealed findings 
similar to those reported in this article, but statistically weaker because of added dependent 
measure noise associated with weak adherence to either (or both) the challenging speed 
                                                 
2 Subjects who cooperate well with the response window instructions have most latencies between 300 ms and 600 
ms.  It is known that responses with latencies  outside this range do not effectively capture effects of masked primes 
(see Greenwald, Abrams, Naccache, & Dehaene, 2003).  Subjects with more than 25% of responses outside this 
range were dropped.  For retained subjects, individual trials outside the range of 250 ms to 800 ms were dropped.   
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instructions of the response window procedure or the perceptually challenging instructions to 
classify visually masked stimuli that were effectively invisible for most subjects. 
Apparatus 
Up to five subjects participated concurrently, each in a cubicle with a 42-cm (diagonal 
dimension) color CRT display operating with 120 Hz refresh rate and a standard QWERTY 
keyboard, both controlled by desktop computers using Inquisit laboratory software (available at 
http://millisecond.com).  Left-hand responses during acquisition, conditioning test, and visibility 
test phases were made by pressing the “D” key, and right-hand responses were given with the 
“K” key.  Stimuli were presented in Arial bold font with size selected so that uppercase letters 
occupied 5.3% of screen height.  An electric fan motor in subjects’ cubicles produced a relatively 
low level of background white noise to mask extraneous sounds. 
Stimuli and Sub-Alphabet Method 
The 26-letter English alphabet was divided into two mutually exclusive letter sets (Set A = 
ADFHJLNOPWY; Set B = BCEGIKMQRSTUVXZ).  Two sets of gendered names and 
valenced words were constructed for use as USs, one set restricted to letters of each sub-
alphabet.  Similarly, two 4-letter consonant string CSs were created from each sub-alphabet (e.g., 
NPLW, DHJF from Set A; BMVZ, GKQX from Set B).  (All stimuli are presented in Appendix 
Table A2.)  The sub-alphabet method assured that no CS from one sub-alphabet ever shared a 
letter with any US (gendered name or valenced word) that had been created using the other sub-
alphabet.  The sub-alphabet strategy thereby avoided complications (in terms of priming) that 
could result from stimulus overlap between CS and US items.  Assignment of a specific sub-
alphabet to CS vs. US role was counterbalanced in each experiment except for three experiments 
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(S6, S10, and S15 in Tables A1 and A2) that used just sub-alphabet B for CSs and sub-alphabet 
A for USs.3   
 CS consonant strings were always presented as uppercase letters; US words and names were 
always lowercase.  This case difference avoided any possibility of confusion between CS letters 
and US letters during tests of CS visibility (see “Visibility Test Trials for Masked CSs”, below). 
Acquisition Procedure 
 Subjects’ task during acquisition (also conditioning test) trials required speeded 
categorization of fully visible US words.  The USs were either affectively polarized words that 
were to be categorized as pleasant vs. unpleasant in meaning, or they were familiar first names 
that were to be categorized as male vs. female.  These stimuli have strongly overlearned valence 
or gender associations that are widely understood to be activated automatically on perceiving the 
words or names.   
 In the acquisition phase, each US word was preceded by one of two CSs, which were 4-letter 
uppercase consonant strings (e.g., DHJF and GKQX).  The four CS letters were sometimes 
presented in a single fixed order and sometimes in four randomly permuted orders.  (See Table 
A2 for these details.)   The acquisition phase of conditioning consisted of between 192 and 336 
CS–US pairings that, in all experiments, were 100% consistent in the pairing of a specific CS 
with one of the two US categories.  That is, one of the 4-consonant CSs (e.g., DHJF) always 
preceded words from one of the US categories (e.g., male names), and a different CS string (e.g., 
GKQX) always preceded words from the complementary US category (e.g., female names). This 
                                                 
3 This sub-alphabet method has, to date, been developed only for use with gender and valence categories.  Those two 
domains were relatively easy to use because of the large number of available valenced words and gendered names in 
English language. 
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is a differential conditioning procedure, which provides distinct CSs for each of two 
complementary USs.   
 In two of Series 1’s experiments, CS duration was manipulated on a within-subjects basis.  
One experiment provided data for conditioning when a 75-ms CS duration was used in 
acquisition with either 25 ms or 75 ms CS duration in conditioning test.  Its data are presented in 
Figure 2.  The second provided data for all four combinations of 25-ms and 75-ms CS durations 
in acquisition and in conditioning test.  Its data are presented in Figure 3.  All other experiments 
used the same CS duration in acquisition and condition test. 
 All stimuli were presented at screen center (see Figure 1 for a schematic depiction of an 
acquisition trial).  For Series 1’s unconscious conditioning experiments each acquisition trial 
started with a 500-ms medium-gray plus sign (“+”) as a focus point.  The focus point was 
replaced by a 300-ms forward mask, which was a randomly selected one of eight patterns of 
randomly arrayed letter fragments.  The forward mask was then replaced by the CS, a consonant 
string.  CS durations ranged between 25ms and 75ms in Series 1.  When CSs were briefer than 
75ms, a backward masking letter-fragment pattern, randomly selected from the 8 mask 
patterns—with the constraint of being different from the forward mask pattern—followed the CS 
and completed the CS–US interval.  The US word or name started immediately after completion 
of the 75-ms CS–US interval.  In the first block of acquisition trials, the US remained on-screen 
until the subject responded by pressing the left (“D”) or right (“K”) key to classify the stimulus.  
After the subject’s key-press response, a 600-ms intertrial interval preceded the next trial’s 
starting focus (“+”) stimulus.  
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Response Window Procedure 
In the second acquisition block and in all subsequent acquisition and conditioning test blocks, a 
response window procedure obliged faster responding to the US than would have occurred with 
standard (“respond rapidly”) reaction-time instructions.  The “window” interval, during which 
the subject was asked to try to respond, was marked by center-screen appearance of a black 
exclamation point that replaced the US word.  Instructions before the second acquisition block 
stressed the importance of responding during the exclamation point’s on-screen presence.  The 
exclamation point’s duration (“window width”) was always 133 ms.  Initially (second acquisition 
block) the exclamation point replaced the valenced word US or gendered name US after that 
word or name had been on screen for 408 ms.  If the subject responded during the exclamation 
point’s presence, the exclamation point turned red and remained red for 300 ms.  If the subject 
failed to respond during the exclamation point’s 133-ms on-screen presence, the exclamation 
point disappeared with no color change.  The subject could therefore know that his or her 
response (a) was faster than desired if the exclamation point never appeared, or (b) was slower 
than desired if the exclamation point disappeared without turning red.  Subjects received end-of-
block feedback reporting the percentage of trials for which their response was successfully “in” 
the window.   The requirement to respond rapidly was increased gradually so that the “center” of 
the 133-ms window advanced from 475 ms after US onset (2nd acquisition block) to 450 ms 
(typically in the 3rd acquisition block), and to 400 ms (typically in the 4th acquisition block), 
remaining at that value for subsequent acquisition blocks and for all conditioning test blocks.  In 
this final configuration, the exclamation point started at 333 ms after US onset and ended 467 ms 
after US onset, or earlier if the response had by then already occurred.  This procedure obliged 
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responding about 150 ms faster than most subjects would routinely give a “rapid” response.  The 
resulting error rates were typically above 15%. 
 Correct responses to the US initiated a standard 600-ms inter-trial interval.  However, during 
all acquisition blocks, incorrect responses triggered a 200-ms center-screen appearance of 
“ERROR” in red capital letters, extending the inter-trial interval by that duration.  No error 
feedback was given in subsequent conditioning test trials. 
Conditioning Test Trials 
Conditioning test blocks were presented with no announcement or appearance of a change from 
the acquisition procedure, apart from informing subjects that error feedback was being 
discontinued.  Subjects in the Series 1 experiments were typically unaware of the essential 
procedural change that enabled the conditioning test—instead of being consistently contingent 
on CS stimuli as in acquisition, US stimuli in conditioning test blocks were presented at random 
in relation to CSs.  Therefore, only 50% of conditioning test trials were consistent with the 
acquisition contingency; the remaining 50% presented a reversal of the consistent acquisition 
contingency.  A higher error rate on inconsistent than consistent trials would be the indicator that 
the CS had acquired some influence over the subject’s responding. 
Visibility Test Trials for Masked CSs 
Implementing the advice of Reingold and Merikle (1988), visibility trials used the same stimulus 
sequence that subjects had experienced during acquisition blocks, including the response 
window’s exclamation point (which no longer turned red, however).  The instructed task in 
visibility test trials was to classify an uppercase consonant string as one of the two 4-letter CS 
strings that were presented in the trial’s sequential position of the CS.  Subjects were to use the 
right (“K”) key to indicate the consonant string that had been associated with right-key responses 
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to US words, and the left (“D”) key for the consonant string that had been associated with left-
key responses to US words.  Because these consonant strings had not been visible to most 
subjects previously in the experiment, it was necessary to use two preliminary practice trial 
blocks to acquaint subjects with the temporal position of the uppercase CS string in the visibility 
test stimulus sequence—immediately following the forward mask and preceding either the 
backward mask (if any) or the US (if CS duration was the full 75-ms duration of the CS–US 
interval).  In the two practice blocks, the CS’s duration was extended to make it easily visible 
(133 ms in the first preliminary block and 100 ms in the second).  Subsequent visibility test trials 
were conducted with the CS duration (between 25 ms and 75 ms) and backward mask (if any) 
that subjects had encountered during their acquisition trials.  For CS-visibility test trial blocks, 
subjects were asked to delay responses until after the response window’s exclamation point had 
disappeared.  This instruction was needed because subjects who responded during the 
exclamation point might have been responding based on a conditioned association rather than 
based on perception of the CS.  To assure that subjects would delay response, any key-press 
responses that occurred sooner than 333 ms after the exclamation point’s disappearance—which 
was 800 ms after US onset—were ignored, meaning that subjects were obliged to repeat their 
CS-classification response if their initial response had been made too rapidly.4 
Contingency Awareness Tests 
Even though it was not likely that subjects would be able to learn the contingent CS–US relation 
in Series 1 experiments, contingency awareness tests were administered in six of the 
14experiments.  The contingency awareness test presented four 4-letter consonant strings, each 
                                                 
4 Previous subliminal priming research using the response window procedure had shown that responses slower than 
500 ms showed no evidence of influence by a preceding masked prime (Greenwald et al., 2003).  This was the 
reason for wanting to assure that CS classification responses on visibility test trials would be delayed until well after 
500 ms had elapsed following appearance of the US name or word on visibility test trials. 
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in a separate test item.  Two of the four strings had appeared during the subject’s acquisition 
trials and the other two had not been seen at all.  (Those previously unseen ones had served as 
CSs for other subjects in the counterbalancing design.)  For each of the four 4-character strings, 
subjects answered a single question.  As illustration, in a condition that used gendered names as 
USs, one of the four questions was:  “In the trials completed so far, did the set of letters DHJF 
usually appear before male or female names?”  There were seven response options: “before male 
names (certainly)”, “before male names (probably)”, “before male names (guess)”, “DHJF did 
not appear in the task”, “before female names (guess)”,”before female names (probably)”, 
“before female names (certainly)”.  For a subject who had seen DHJF consistently paired with 
female names, the 7 options were scored ranging from –3 for the diametrically wrong response 
(“before male names (certainly)”) to +3 for the fully accurate response “before female names 
(certainly)”).  Scores were converted to an awareness score by averaging the accuracy scores for 
the two strings that the subject had encountered.  A fully correct response therefore received a +3 
score.  A negative average score indicated guessing in favor of incorrect contingencies.   
 
Signal Detection Sensitivity (d′) Measures of Conditioning and CS Visibility 
The regression intercept tests described in the next paragraph require that zero values of both CS 
visibility and conditioning test measures have rational zero interpretations.  These rational zero 
values were assured by converting the data of conditioning and visibility test trials to signal 
detection sensitivity (d′) measures, for which zero scores indicate absence of effect.  Use of the d′ 
metric required scoring each trial’s response as a ‘hit’ (vs. a ‘miss’) or as a ‘false alarm’ (vs. a 
‘correct rejection’).  When the presented CS was the one associated in acquisition with a right-
key response, the hit measure was scored as “1” when subjects gave the (correct) right-key 
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response, and “0” (= miss) otherwise.  When the presented CS was one that had been 
consistently associated in acquisition with the US corresponding to the left key response, the 
false alarm measure was scored “1” when subjects gave an erroneous right-key response, and “0” 
(=correct rejection)  otherwise.  Hit (h) and false alarms (fa) rates were converted to signal 
detection d′ values by converting their representation as proportions (i.e., hits divided by number 
of right-key CS trials, and false alarms divided by number of left-key CS trials) to z values via an 
inverse normal transformation, then computing d′ = zh – zfa.5  Because h and fa proportions of 
either 0 or 1 do not allow the inverse normal transformation (i.e., they would require a division 
by zero), an end-point correction was used:  0s were replaced with .25/N and 1s were replaced 
with (1 – .25/N), where N is the number of trials used in the denominator of the proportion.  
Banaji and Greenwald (1995) found that these end-point  conversions were superior to those 
more standardly recommended in statistics texts (e.g., Agresti, 1990).   
 For the visibility test, hit rates were computed as proportions of (correct) identifications of 
the CS associated during acquisition with correct right key responses to USs, and false alarms as 
proportion of (erroneous) identifications of the CS associated with correct left key responses as 
the right-key CS.  
Intercept Tests in Regressions of Conditioning on CS Visibility and Contingency 
Awareness 
When both the indirect measure of a masked stimulus’s effect (conditioning in these 
experiments) and a direct measure of the masked stimulus’s visibility are measured on scales 
                                                 
5 To translate d′ values to more meaningful numbers, d′ values of 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20 can be understood, 
respectively, as 4%, 6%, and 8% greater accuracy on conditioning-consistent test trials, compared to inconsistent 
ones.   When these are reported as intercept effects, that differential accuracy is the estimated level associated 
performance at chance on the visibility tests the measure ability to distinguish 4-consonant string associated 
consistently with left-key responses from the those associated with right-key responses.   
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with rational zero values, the regression of the indirect effect on the visibility measure estimates 
the magnitude of indirect effect associated with the value of 0.0 on the direct measure of 
visibility (Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996; Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995).  In the 
present studies, visibility and contingency awareness tests provided direct measures of CS 
visibility and contingency awareness, respectively.  The conditioning d′ measure assessed an 
indirect (uninstructed) effect of the CS.  Significantly positive values of the d′ measure of 
conditioning associated with zero on the CS-visibility measure (i.e., the regression intercept) 
therefore indicated unconscious conditioning—i.e., finding a significant conditioning effect 
associated with the zero value of CS visibility (Greenwald et al., 1995).  Similarly, significantly 
positive conditioning values associated with zero on the contingency awareness measure would 
indicate a different form of unconscious conditioning—conditioning in the absence of awareness 
of the CS–US contingency.  In this research, positive intercept d′ values for which 99% 
confidence intervals excluded zero were interpreted as indicating conditioning in the absence of 
visibility or awareness.  A 95% confidence interval was not used because the number of such 
tests conducted in this research (e.g., 18 tests in the Series 1 experiments) afforded excessive 
probability of Type I error due to the use of multiple tests—a Bonferroni correction procedure 
might have justified using an even wider confidence interval than 99%.   
 An important caveat about these regression intercept tests is that, when the predictor (either 
visibility or contingency awareness) has imperfect reliability the intercept can be spuriously 
statistically significant.  This possibility was considered in detail in this research, aided by the 
simulations described under the next heading. 
 In the two Series 1 experiments in which CS duration was manipulated, separate regression 
analyses were conducted for each combination of acquisition and conditioning test CS durations.  
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Visibility d′ measures for these regressions were computed using the subset of visibility test trials 
based on just the visibility test CS stimuli that had the same experimental history (acquisition CS 
duration and conditioning test CS duration).  These CSs were presented in visibility tests at the 
same CS duration used for them in the conditioning test. 
Simulations to Generate and Test Spuriously Significant Intercept Effects 
It is not difficult to generate data sets that have spuriously significant intercepts.  Simulations 
designed with (a) true criterion-measure intercepts of zero, (b) a positive slope of the criterion 
measure on the predictor, and (c) a predictor with non-trivial measurement error (unreliability) 
will routinely produce spuriously significant intercepts if the regression slope is more than 
weakly positive.  A simulation with such characteristics was used to produce spuriously 
significant intercepts in10 simulated samples of N=110 (this was the average sample size for the 
nine Series 1 experiments that used CS durations ≥ 58 ms).  The statistical program to generate 
these samples, along with an Excel spreadsheet that rapidly produces and graphically displays 
simulations with spurious intercepts can be found in the study archive (to be made publicly 
available together with publication of this article).  An unusual, but desirable, feature of these 
simulations is that they allowed measurement errors for both predictor and criterion variables to 
vary as a function of the latent (“true-score”) values of these variables.  To explain why this was 
done:  (a) random error necessarily comprises 100% of a conditioning or visibility measure when 
the latent value for that measure is zero and (b) random error logically should decrease to zero as 
scores of each of these measures achieve their maximum values (indicating perfect visibility or 
contingency awareness).  Intuitively, this simulation feature maps onto an assumption that (a) 
when true visibility or true contingency awareness is totally absent, observed visibility or 
awareness scores are purely error variance, and (b) this error component should decrease to zero 
Greenwald & De Houwer: Conscious and Unconscious Conditioning 16 August 2017 - 18 - 
as these latent measures achieve maximum values.  The first ten data sets produced by the 
simulation script that incorporated these features were saved for analyses that are described in 
this article; these analyses used the errors-in-variables adjustment method described by Klauer, 
Draine, and Greenwald (1998) and Klauer, Greenwald, and Draine (1998). 
Power and Data Collection Stopping Strategies 
An aim of this research was to establish limiting conditions of unconscious conditioning 
findings.  The initial findings of Series 1 experiments suggested that CS duration was a critical 
moderator, which explains why the Series 1 experiments examined a range of CS durations.  The 
most important inferential statistical tests were for significance of a regression intercept effect 
that, if significant, supports a conclusion of unconscious conditioning.  Subliminal priming 
experiments that had used the same form of regression intercept test usually observed intercepts 
of d′ = 0.10 (or larger), with standard deviations of intercept estimates typically close to 0.25.  
Using those as the basis for power calculations, experiments with N=70 had power of .92 (at 2-
tailed α = .05) to find a statistically significant finding if a true intercept value was 0.10.  Most 
experiments were therefore conducted with at least 70 subjects.  The one experiment conducted 
at Ghent University had 32 subjects.  For practical considerations, this was an initially planned 
stopping point.  Using the observed effect size (d′ = 0.177) of the experiment for which it was a 
replication, and using an expected standard deviation of 0.30, the power associated with sample 
size of 32 was .92. 
 Power considerations were less central for experiments in which the aim was to establish 
limiting conditions for the conditioning effect (i.e., when null results were expectable).  To 
establish a null conclusion, the need is to identify a narrow confidence interval that includes the 
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intercept value of zero.  This required considerably larger sample sizes, which were used 
especially for the present Series 2 (conscious conditioning) experiments. 
 In most of the present experiments, data collection was stopped at a point too early for 
appropriate hypothesis testing—this was a standard laboratory procedure to assure that 
experiments were free of previously undetected programming errors.  In a few cases in which 
program errors were indeed found, flawed data were discarded and the experiment was re-
initiated with corrected procedures.   
 For several experiments that ultimately had null findings, data collections were re-initiated 
after an initially planned stop.  The re-initiation was in the expectation of allowing increased 
confidence in a null finding.  In one experiment for which analysis after the initially planned stop 
yielded a statistically significant result with a p value falling in an understood ‘marginal’ range, 
additional data were collected to increase confidence that the result warranted interpretation as a 
null hypothesis rejection.  A few experiments were run with more subjects than needed for 
adequate power, for the (scientifically irrelevant) reason that it was administratively inconvenient 
to stop data collection. 
Series 1 (Unconscious Conditioning) Results Series 1 provided 18 hypothesis within 14 
experiments.  Seven of the 18 hypothesis tests are presented here as Experiments 1a (2 
hypothesis tests from within-subject conditions), 1b (4 hypothesis tests from within-subject 
conditions), and 1c (1 condition).  Results for 11 additional 11 Series 1 hypothesis tests are in the 
Supplemental Material.  These additional experiments served partly to replicate results in 
Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c, and partly to locate a boundary between acquisition CS durations (≤ 
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42ms) too brief to obtain unconscious conditioning and durations (≥ 58 ms) at which 
conditioning was reliably observed. 
 Experiment 1a used a 75 ms duration for CSs on all acquisition trials, while varying CS 
duration randomly between 25 ms and 75 ms, within blocks, on conditioning test trials.  The 
data, which are presented in Figure 2, show that conditioning was observed only when the 75-ms 
CS duration was used in the conditioning test (Panel A of Figure 2).  The same subjects, tested 
with the same stimuli, but presented in conditioning test with a 25 ms CS duration (plus 50 ms 
backward mask) showed no evidence for conditioning (Panel B of Figure 2). 
 Experiment 1b had four within-subject conditions, with CS duration varied between the two 
values of 25 ms and 75 ms during both acquisition and conditioning test trials— randomly within 
blocks of trials in both phases.  This procedure allowed CSs experienced only at 25 ms duration 
during acquisition trials to be tested during conditioning tests at either 25 ms or 75 ms durations.  
Similarly, CSs experienced with 75 ms duration in acquisition trials were tested at both 25 ms 
and 75 ms durations in the conditioning test phase.  This design required use of distinct CS 
stimuli at the two durations during acquisition (the stimuli are shown in Table A1).  Experiment 
1b’s findings (see Figure 3) showed that conditioning occurred only when the longer CS duration 
(75 ms) was used for both acquisition and conditioning test phases.  That is, the only one of the 
four within-subject treatments that produced conditioning involved stimuli experienced with 75 
ms CS duration in acquisition and then tested with 75 ms CS duration during the conditioning 
test phase.   
 Additional experiments in Series 1 (see Figure 4) had CS durations of 25, 33, 42, 58, or 75 
ms, used identically in both acquisition and conditioning tests.  (Procedural details for all of 
these are in Appendix Tables A1 and A2.)  One other  replication examined specifically the 
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combination of 75 ms CS duration in acquisition and 25 ms duration in conditioning test, which 
appears in both Experiment 1a (Figure 2,  Panel B) and Experiment 1b (Figure 3, Panel C).  
Because the result for this combination in Experiment 1b was marginally significant, the added 
replication (see Supplemental Material, Figure S2) was useful to reinforce the null conclusion for 
this combination of CS durations in acquisition and conditioning test phases.   Figure 4’s 
summary of the Series 1 findings makes apparent that conditioning was evident only in the nine 
experiments for which CS durations were 58 ms or greater in both acquisition and conditioning 
test.  In only one of those nine experiments was the key statistical test (for the intercept effect) 
non-significant at the .01 level (see Supplemental Material, Figure S11). 
 Experiment 1c (see Figure 5) was conducted at the end of Series 1, using 75-ms CS durations 
in both acquisition and conditioning test phases.  This combination of CS and US durations had 
already been shown to produce conditioning in Experiments 1a and 1b, as well as in three other 
replications (Supplemental Material, Figures S15–S17).  Experiment 1c was  the largest of the 
six Series 1 experiments that included a contingency awareness measure.  The regression 
scatterplot in Figure 5 shows that scores for contingency awareness in Experiment 1c were 
symmetrically distributed around zero.  Not even one subject in Experiment 1c showed perfect 
contingency awareness.  Nevertheless, conditioning was statistically significant.  Experiment 
1c’s test for regression of conditioning performance on CS visibility (rather than contingency 
awareness) shows the usual Series 1 pattern of a significant intercept effect and a non-significant 
regression slope (see scatterplot in Supplemental Material Fig. S18). 
Series 2 (Conscious Conditioning) Method and Results 
 The two experiments in Series 2 allowed CSs to be visible to all subjects, by using a 375ms 
CS–US interval and omitting the forward mask used in all Series 1 experiments.  CSs, which 
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ranged in duration from 75 ms to 375 ms in these experiments, started immediately after the 
trial-initiating 500-ms focus (“+”) stimulus (no forward mask for the CS was used). 
 Each of Experiments 2a and 2b consisted of three sub-experiments that varied CS 
presentation procedures to vary ease of noticing and remembering CS–US contingences.  
Experiment 2a had more acquisition trials (250) than Experiment 2b (168). Experiments 2a and 
2b also differed in the location of their contingency awareness tests in the subjects’ series of 
tasks (see General Methods section for details).  Measuring contingency awareness after the 
conditioning test in Experiment 2a avoided possible influence on the conditioning test of 
contingency information that might be learned during the awareness test.  Placing the 
contingency awareness test prior to the conditioning in Experiment 2b maximized likelihood of 
measuring contingency awareness before possible forgetting.  Use of both sequences provides 
more confidence in findings than if only one of these had been used. 
 The differences among three variations of each experiment assured that there would be a 
range of contingency awareness scores that extended to the extremes of the measure—ranging 
from zero contingency awareness to perfect contingency awareness.   This strategy was needed 
to obtain adequately powerful regression tests of the role of contingency awareness in 
conditioning.   
 In Experiment 2a, greatest awareness was produced by giving advance information of the 
specifics of the contingency (i.e., the details of which 4-letter CS consonant string was associated 
with which US word or name category); intermediate awareness used the same stimulus 
presentation procedure without providing any advance contingency information; and lowest 
contingency awareness was produced by additionally reducing the CS from 375-ms duration to 
the first 83 ms of that interval, followed by a backward mask for remaining 292 ms of the CS–
Greenwald & De Houwer: Conscious and Unconscious Conditioning 16 August 2017 - 23 - 
US interval.  Because of the lack of any forward mask, the CS was clearly visible to all subjects 
even with the backward-masked 83-ms CS.   
 Because the three variations of Experiment 2a, overall, observed greater contingency 
awareness than desired (too many subjects with perfect contingency awareness), the three 
variations in Experiment 2b mildly increased the difficulty of contingency discovery.  To obtain 
the highest level of contingency awareness in Experiment 2b, the CS was presented for full 
duration of the 375-ms CS–US interval in acquisition and subjects were given advance 
information that there was a contingency in effect, but they were not given the specifics of the 
contingency; for the intermediate level, subjects received no advance information about presence 
of a contingency and the CS duration was reduced to 75 ms followed by a blank screen for 300 
ms (the CS remained fully and easily visible); to produce the lowest level of contingency 
awareness, the 75-ms CS duration was followed by a 100-ms backward mask, which was 
followed by a blank screen for 200 ms.  With this last procedure, the CS remained fully visible, 
but it had no visible persistence, creating an increased processing burden to retain awareness of 
the CS’s identity until the US was presented.  Of the 583 subjects who completed awareness tests 
in Experiments 2a and 2b, 37% had zero contingency awareness, 31% had perfect contingency 
awareness, and the remaining 32% were distributed between these extremes.   
 The procedure variations that reduced contingency awareness in Experiments 2a and 2b did 
not interfere with clear visibility of the CS.  Those who became aware of the contingency during 
acquisition were expected to discover rapidly during the conditioning test phase that the 
contingency was no longer in effect.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, evidence for conditioning 
weakened from the first to the second of the two 48-trial conditioning test blocks.  Figure 6 
shows that there was a significant positive relationship between contingency awareness and 
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conditioning that extended to the second conditioning test block in Experiment 2a.  Figure 7 
shows that in Experiment 2b, which overall had less contingency awareness than Experiment 2a, 
the positive relation between contingency awareness and conditioning was limited to the first 
conditioning test block.   
 The finding that all four regression intercepts in Figures 6 and 7 were slightly positive (but 
not significantly so at α = .05, 2-tailed) suggested that subjects who lacked contingency 
awareness might have displayed some weak conditioning effect.  However, these weak positive 
intercepts could also have been statistical artifacts resulting from measurement error in the 
regression predictor.  This artifact possibility can be evaluated with an errors in variables 
method (Klauer, Draine, & Greenwald, 1998; Klauer, Greenwald, & Draine, 1998) that adjusts 
estimates of both regression slope and intercept for measurement error in the predictor.  Before 
this adjustment, the four intercepts were 0.158, 0.088, 0.053, and 0.045).  After adjustment, none 
of these intercepts was above zero—they were, respectively, –0.476, –0.343, –0.019, and –0.012.   
 To determine whether conditioning was obtained among subjects whose contingency 
awareness scores revealed no awareness, the data for subjects having zero values on the 
contingency awareness measures in the six procedural variations (three in each of Experiments 
2a and 2b) were meta-analyzed to provide an overall Bayes Factor estimate of odds favoring the 
null hypothesis (i.e., no conditioning) relative to the alternative hypothesis of conditioning > 0.6  
This test was conducted separately on results for the first conditioning test block alone, the 
second block alone, and the average of both blocks.  Results favored the null hypothesis by odds 
ratios of 21.0:1, 10.5:1, and 19.3:1, respectively, in these three tests.  All three odds ratios 
                                                 
6 The Bayes Factor analysis used the meta.ttestBF command of BayesFactor 0.9.12–2 (downloaded 28 November 
2015 at http://ftp.ussg.iu.edu/CRAN/bin/windows/contrib/3.2/BayesFactor_0.9.12-2.zip). 
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exceeded the 10:1 criterion for characterizing a Bayes Factor estimate as showing “strong 
evidence for H0” (Wetzels, Matzke, Lee, Rouder, Iverson, & Wagenmakers, 2011). 
 
General Discussion 
 Series 1 found statistically significant evidence for conditioning in 8 of 9 data sets for which 
CS durations were at least 58 ms in both acquisition and conditioning test phases.  In contrast, 
there was no evidence for conditioning in any of nine experiments in which CS durations were 
briefer than 42 ms in either acquisition or conditioning test. Experiment 1c found evidence for 
conditioning in the absence of evidence either for conscious perception of the CS or contingency 
awareness.  All of the present experiments used a conservative 2-tailed α = .01 significance 
criterion, due to the number of significance tests that were conducted.  The left half of Figure 4 
shows that two of the nine experiments with CS durations ≤ 42 ms (3rd and 7th from the left) 
had regression intercepts at the margin of statistical significance.  Also, the meta-analytic 
average of those nine intercepts (dotted horizontal line in the left half of Figure 4) was slightly 
positive.  This is consistent with the hypothesis of a very small conditioning effect—one that 
would require an extremely large sample size to produce statistical significance; this could be an 
effect that occurred in only a small minority of subjects.   
 In Series 2, using fully visible CSs presented during a 375 ms CS–US interval, conditioning 
effects reliably occurred for subjects who could partially or completely report the CS–US 
contingencies; however, conditioning was absent for subjects who lacked contingency 
awareness.  
 Together, the findings of the Series 1 and Series 2 experiments identify two types of 
conditioning.  One type requires neither conscious perception of the CS nor awareness of the 
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CS–US contingency, and is reasonably labeled ‘unconscious conditioning’.  The other requires 
both a visible CS and awareness of the CS–US contingency, and is reasonably labeled ‘conscious 
conditioning’.  This identification of two types of conditioning opposes single-process 
propositional theories of human conditioning, according to which all human conditioning 
requires awareness of the CS-US contingency. At the same time, it also shows that when CS–US 
intervals and CS durations are long enough to permit visibility of the CS, conditioning does 
depend on contingency awareness.    
How Convincingly has Unconscious Conditioning been Demonstrated? 
 Regression analyses of the Series 1 experiments with CS durations ≥ 58ms repeatedly found 
statistically significant evidence for conditioning when visual discriminability of CSs was at 
chance.  Because the regression intercepts that tested these effects can be inflated when there is 
measurement error in the visibility predictor (Klauer, Greenwald, & Draine, 1998), those 
skeptical about unconscious conditioning may suggest the alternative hypothesis that the 
significant intercepts in the Series 1 experiments are such artifacts.  In more detail, this skeptical 
argument has four steps: (i) Conditioning requires conscious perception of the CS, which is 
either sufficient to produce conditioning, or may be needed to allow development of contingency 
awareness that is needed for conditioning; (ii) the visibility measure contains measurement error 
and may therefore fail to reveal subjects’ true perception of CSs; (iii) therefore, some proportion 
of subjects who have been conditioned because the CS was consciously visible to them have CS-
visibility scores that are (erroneously) near zero; and (iv) these (presumably) consciously 
conditioned subjects are responsible for the significant intercept findings.  Validity of this 4-step 
argument can be evaluated using three types of data that were available in Series 1’s 
experiments.  
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 Tests of contingency awareness in Series 1 experiments.  Experiment 1c was the largest of 
six Series 1 experiments that included contingency awareness measures.  Because of its brief (75 
ms), masked CS, subjects in this experiment were not expected to develop contingency 
awareness.  The contingency awareness test was administered immediately after 5 blocks of 
acquisition trials (total of 192 trials) that had a 100% consistent CS–US contingency.   The 
regression scatterplot of Experiment 1c’s conditioning result (see Supplemental Material, Figure 
S18) shows a statistically significant intercept.  Figure 5 shows Experiment 1c’s conditioning test 
measure regressed on its contingency awareness measure.  In addition to showing a significant 
intercept that reveals conditioning in the absence of contingency awareness, Figure 5 shows that 
not even one subject in the experiment achieved complete contingency awareness.  Of the three 
other experiments in Series 1 that had CS durations ≥ 58 ms and used the contingency awareness 
measure, all found significant intercept effects (see Supplemental Material Figures 10, 11, and 
12) and all also showed that not a single subject had complete contingency awareness.   
 In the fourth Series 1 experiment with CS duration ≥ than 58 ms that had a contingency 
awareness test (its conditioning data are in Supplemental Material Figure S10), the contingency 
awareness test had a different purpose.  After three (of five) acquisition blocks, subjects in two of 
three between-subjects conditions received instructions informing them (a) that there was a 
contingency in effect, (b) that they should attempt to learn it, (c) that to make it possible for them 
to learn the contingency, the 4-consonant CSs would be displayed for a sufficient duration for 
them to be easily visible, and (d) that after 20 such pairings they would be tested for knowledge 
of the contingency.  After those 20 trials (with 375-ms CS durations) and the contingency 
awareness test, the two remaining blocks of acquisition returned to the previous 58-ms CS 
durations, after which subjects then continued with the conditioning test followed by the CS 
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visibility test.  In one of these two conditions, the instructed contingency (after Block 3 of 
acquisition) was the one used in all other acquisition trials.  In the second condition, the 
instructed contingency was the reverse (right–left switched) of the contingency used for all other 
acquisition trials.  In each of these two conditions, almost all subjects showed that they had 
properly learned the contingency presented during the 20 visible-CS trials.  The subsequent 
conditioning test showed that the (properly) learned contingency had no effect at all; it produced 
neither greater conditioning when it was consistent with all other acquisition trials, nor did it 
reduce conditioning when it was reversed. Hence, the conditioning effect observed in this study 
did not depend on what participants consciously learned about the CS-US contingencies. 
Because of that lack of effect, the results shown in the Supplemental Material’s Figure S10 are 
collapsed over the experiment’s three conditions.    
 The small subset of subjects who could see masked CSs showed no enhanced 
conditioning.  Regression plots presented in the Supplemental Material include five Series 1 
experiments in which CS durations ≥ 58ms allowed a small proportion of subjects to 
discriminate the CSs on many or most trials (see data in Supplemental Material Figures S10 and 
S15–18). Visibility test d′ values of 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0 in those experiments translate, 
approximately, to correct response rates of 84%. 89%, and 93%.  Even higher visibility scores 
than d′ = 3.0 occurred occasionally in these experiments, indicating that some subjects could see 
the CS on nearly every trial.  If slight visibility is sufficient for conditioning, it is difficult to 
understand why the subjects who had those high levels of visibility did not show noticeably 
stronger conditioning than the much larger group of subjects whose visibility scores were near 
zero.  The appropriate interpretation may be that, even for subjects who could see the CS in 
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Series 1’s experiments,  the 75-ms CS–US interval was too brief to permit them to process the 
CS–US relation sufficiently to consciously discern the contingency.   
 Statistical adjustments supported by simulations indicated that regression intercept 
effects were not spurious.  The statistical procedure that was used in Series 2’s experiments to 
adjust regression intercepts for unreliability of the contingency awareness predictor (Klauer, 
Draine, & Greenwald, 1998; Klauer, Greenwald, & Draine, 1998) was applied similarly to the 
nine Series 1 experiments in which CS durations were ≥ 58 ms.  The adjustment algorithm halted 
for two of these experiments—ones that had visibility scores averaging very near zero; this is 
understood as a circumstance in which adjustment is not needed.  Each of the other seven 
significant intercept effects remained statistically significant after adjustment; their Cohen’s d 
values averaged 0.34 both before and after applying the adjustment algorithm.   
 To be confident in the adjustment algorithm’s effectiveness, ten simulation data sets based on 
true intercepts of zero were generated (see General Methods for details of these simulations).  
The 10 simulated intercepts ranged, in Cohen’s d units, from 0.06 to 0.36.  Eight of these were 
statistically significant.  Because of the known model used to generate the data, their statistical 
significance could only have been spurious.  When the Klauer et al. adjustment algorithm was 
applied, none of the eight that had been (spuriously) significant remained statistically significant 
(all p >.18, 2-tailed).  The adjustment dropped the average effect size for the 10 simulated 
intercepts from Cohen’s d = 0.26 before correction to Cohen’s d = 0.02 after correction.7  
                                                 
7 A concern sometimes raised regarding the possibility of spurious intercepts is that a curvilinear function passing 
through the origin (i.e., no significant intercept) and rising rapidly at low levels of visibility before leveling off 
might be statistically mistaken for a significant intercept.  This hypothesis is not addressed by the Klauer correction 
method, nor has any additional method been developed for this purpose.  No better suggestion is available than to 
examine regression scatterplots (in Supplemental Material, Figs. S10–S18) to see if some such curvilinear function 
seems consistent with the displayed data.   
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 The several data-based considerations make it extremely implausible that the eight 
statistically significant intercept effects observed in Series 1’s experiments were artifacts of 
unreliably measured CS visibility.  Both individually and in the aggregate, those eight significant 
intercept effects warrant interpretation as indicators of unconscious conditioning. 
What has been Conditioned to What? 
The effective CSs in this research might have been each consonant string as a unit, or the 
individual letters in each string, or even the component features of those letters.  The research 
was not designed to distinguish those possibilities.  Related to this unanswered question is an 
answerable one that was raised by a reviewer of this article:  Could there have been confounds in 
the design such that letters of the US words might have been more similar to the letters of their 
paired CS than were letters of the complementary US word category?  Because CS and US 
words were never selected from the same sub-alphabet (see description of the sub-alphabet 
method in the General Methods section) there was no possibility that the letters used in CS 
strings could be used in any US words with which they were paired in any experiment.  And, 
because assignments of specific CS consonant strings to US categories were counterbalanced in 
most experiments (see Table A1), those counterbalanced experiments did not allow the 
possibility of a priming artifact due to shared letter features between CSs and USsfrom different 
sub-alphabets. 
 Theoretically, the more interesting part of the question about what was conditioned concerns 
identification of the conditioned response.  During conditioning tests, did the CS presentation (a) 
elicit a conditioned manual response (to left or right key), (b) influence the identification of the 
specific stimuli used as USs, or (c) influence the identification of the semantic category to which 
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the USs belonged?   Future research may be able to provide a decisive empirical answer to this 
question. 
Summary and Theoretical Conclusions 
 Previous findings of unconscious conditioning in human subjects (e.g., Clark, Mann, & 
Squire, 2002; Clark & Squire, 1998) have often been greeted skeptically.  This article’s Series 1 
experiments avoided objections posed in past critiques by adapting methods that had previously 
served to overcome critiques of research demonstrating subliminal (i.e., unconscious) priming.  
Using those methods, this article’s Series 1’s findings of experiments that used CS–US intervals 
of 75 ms and CS durations ≥ 58 ms in both acquisition and conditioning test repeatedly found (in 
8 of 9 experiments) statistically significant evidence for conditioning.    This conditioning 
occurred in the absence of evidence for either visibility of the CSs (all 9 studies) or awareness of 
the CS–US contingency (in the four experiments that tested for contingency awareness).   
 This article’s Series 2 experiments differed from Series 1 in using a longer (375 ms) CS–US 
interval in which CSs were fully visible.  In one of these, contingency awareness tests were 
placed after conditioning tests, to avoid any possibility that CS information presented in testing 
contingency awareness might produce contingency awareness that had not been achieved during 
acquisition trials.     
 Series 1’s unconscious conditioning findings fit with an associative binding interpretation—
this binding can be understood as the integration of features that belong to a single ‘event file’ 
(Hommel, 2004).  Because the likelihood of two features (e.g., CS and US) being integrated into 
the same neural record should decrease as their temporal separation increases, unconscious 
conditioning may require very brief inter-stimulus intervals, such as the 75-ms CS–US interval 
used in Series 1.  This interpretation bears on the hypothesis that unconscious conditioning is 
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more likely with delay than with trace conditioning procedures (Clark & Squire, 1998; 
Weidemann, Best, Lee, & Lovibond, 2013).  In delay conditioning, CS offset is simultaneous 
with US offset; in trace procedures CS offset precedes US onset.  The present findings suggest 
that brevity of the interval between CS and US onsets is more critical to unconscious 
conditioning than is simultaneity of their offsets, which did not characterize any of the present 
experiments.8  
 Even without a decisive mechanistic understanding of differences between conscious and 
unconscious conditioning, the present findings challenge the assumption that a single-process 
propositional account can explain all human conditioning.  The only substantial change in 
procedure between the present Series 1 and Series 2 experiments was an increase of the interval 
between CS and US onsets from 75 ms to 375 ms, thereby rendering the CS visible, which in 
turn provided opportunity to learn the CS–US contingency. By establishing that unconscious and 
conscious conditioning can be produced and distinguished using procedures that differ only in 
the CS–US temporal relation, the present findings provide a basis for further investigations to 
develop understanding of these distinct forms of conditioning. 
  
                                                 
8 To be clear, simultaneous offset of CS and US was not possible with the present procedure, in which the CS and 
US stimuli appeared at the same (centered) screen location.  For offsets to be simultaneous, the two would have had 
to be superimposed during US presentation, which would have rendered the US illegible.  
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Figure Captions 
1. Stimulus presentation sequence in conditioning test trials for Series 1 experiments.  All Series 
1 experiments used a 75-ms onset interval between starts of CS letter strings and US words.  CS 
duration (t) varied between 25ms and 75ms.  For t < 75, a backward mask filled the remainder of 
the CS–US interval.  The requirement to respond during the response window signal 
(exclamation point) obliged sufficiently rapid responding to produce substantial error rates.  
Conditioning was detected as greater accuracy when the conditioning-test CS–US pairings were 
consistent with those used during acquisition than when they were inconsistent.  
2. Results of Experiment 1a.  (A) When the CS–US interval in both acquisition and conditioning 
test was 75 ms, unconscious conditioning was obtained, indicated by positive difference from 
zero of the intercept in the regression of the conditioning measure on the CS-visibility measure. 
(B) No conditioning was apparent when the CS–US interval in conditioning test was reduced to 
25 ms. Each data point (small circle) indicates a single subject’s data. Dashed lines bound the 
regression slopes’ 99% confidence intervals.  Experiment 1a had a within-subjects design in 
which CS durations were varied within conditioning test blocks.  As a consequence, each subject 
(N=97) appears in both panels. 
3. Results of Experiment 1b.  Interpretation of regression intercepts is as in Fig. 2.  Only in Panel 
D, where CS duration in both acquisition and conditioning test trials was 75ms (rather than 25ms 
in either or both) was there evidence for unconscious conditioning.  Dashed lines bound the 
regression slopes’ 99% confidence intervals.  Experiment 1b had a within-subjects design in 
which CS durations were varied within-blocks.  As a consequence, each subject (N=85) appears 
in all four panels. 
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4. Summary intercepts for regressions of conditioning on CS visibility for the 18 data sets in 
Series 1.  Error bars are 99% confidence intervals.  The dashed vertical line separates 9 data sets 
for which CS durations were ≤ 42 ms from 9 data sets for which CS durations were ≥ 58 ms. 
Dotted horizontal lines show weighted means of the intercept for each set of these groups of data 
sets.  Asterisks mark the six data sets for which individual subject data are displayed in Figs. 2 
and 3.  The 18 data sets are in the same order (left to right) as the 18 regression scatterplots in the 
Supplemental Material (S1 to S18). 
5. Conditioning test data of Experiment 1c, plotted as a function of CS–US contingency 
awareness. With the CS duration of 75ms in this experiment, not even one subject achieved a 
perfect contingency awareness of +3.  All scores reflect some degree of guessing, which was 
inaccurate (below zero) as often as accurate (above zero).  Dashed lines bound the regression 
slopes’ 99% confidence intervals.   
6. Conditioning as a function of contingency awareness in first (A) and second (B) conditioning 
test blocks of Experiment 2a. CS–US intervals of 375ms allowed all CSs to be visible.  For the 
awareness measure, +3 indicates perfect contingency knowledge. Dashed lines bound the 
regression slopes’ 99% confidence intervals. The combination of significant slopes and non-
significant intercepts support the conclusion that conditioning required awareness of the CS–US 
contingency. Each circle represents a single subject’s data (N=213). 
7. Conditioning as a function of contingency awareness in first (A) and second (B) conditioning 
test blocks of Experiment 2b.  The CS–US interval was 375ms for both acquisition and 
conditioning test trials.  CSs were visible, but were reduced in duration in the second and third of 
three procedural variations, all of which are combined in this plot. The absence of significant 
intercepts and the presence of  a significant positive slope (A only) is consistent with the 
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conclusion that conditioning requires awareness of the CS–US contingency. Dashed lines bound 
the regression slopes’ 99% confidence intervals. Each circle represents a single subject’s data 
(N=337). 
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CS durations:  acquisition = 75ms; test = 25ms;   N = 97
Intercept:  d′ = .006,  99% CI=(–.049, .061); t(76) = 0.29, p = .77
Slope:  B = –.057, 99%CI=–.183, .070); t(97) = –1.17, p = .24
CS durations:  acquisition = 75ms; test = 75ms;   N = 97
Intercept:  d′ = .117,  99% CI=(.052, .183); t(96) = 4.73, p = .10–5
Slope:  B = .108, 99%CI=–.048, .265); t(96) = 1.82, p = .07
A B
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CS durations:  acquisition = 25ms; test = 25ms; N = 85
Intercept:  d’ =– .027, 99%CI=(-.098,.044); t(83) = –1.00, p = .32
Slope:  B = 0.102, 99%CI=(-.133,.337), t(83) = 1.15, p = .25
CS durations:  acquisition = 25ms; test = 75ms; N = 85
Intercept:  d’ =– .008, 99%CI=(-.106, .090); t(83) = –0.21, p = .84
Slope:  B = 0.034, 99%CI=(-. 282, .350), t(83) = 0.29, p = .78
CS durations:  acquisition = 75ms; test = 25ms; N = 85
Intercept:  d’ =– .063, 99%CI=(-.004, .130); t(83) = 2.48, p = .02
Slope:  B = .055, 99%CI=(-.174, .283), t(83) = 0.63, p = .53
A B
C
CS durations:  acquisition = 75ms; test = 75ms; N = 85
Intercept:  d’ = .125, 99%CI=(.042, .208); t(83) =  3.96, p = .0002
Slope:  B = 0.024, 99%CI=(-.232, .280), t(83) = 0.25, p = .80
D
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Figure 4 
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
intercept d’ = .158;
99%CI = (–.063,.378), p = .06
slope =  .152; 
99%CI = (.052,.253), p = .0001
intercept d’ = .088; 
99%CI = (–.092,.268), p = .20
slope =  .084;
99%CI = (.002,.166), p = .009
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
intercept d’ = .053;
99%CI = (–.041,.147), p = .15
slope =  .096; 
99%CI = (.044,.147), p = 10–6
intercept d’ = .045; 
99%CI = (–.057,.146), p = .25
slope =  .031;
99%CI = (–.024,.087), p = .15
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Table A1.  Stimulus Items for All Experiments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 sub-alphabet A  (ADFHJLNOPWY) sub-alphabet B  (BCEGIKMQRSTUVXZ) 
Experiment. and 
data 
locations 
CS consonant 
strings 
US gendered names or valenced words 
CS consonant 
strings 
US gendered names or valenced words 
1a  (Figs. 2, S1, 
S13); 
also Figs. S2, S7 
{FJNP, JNPF, 
NPFJ, PFJN} 
vs. 
DHLW,HLWD, 
LWDH,WDHL} 
female:  joan, donna, dawn, lola, polly, wanda, anna, 
hannah, holly, ann, nora, Wynona 
 
male: { john, jonah, andy, dan, alan, wally, noah, 
dylan, nolan, ladd, jay, donald} 
{BMVZ,MVZB, 
VZBM,ZBMV} 
vs. 
{GKQX,KQXG, 
QXGK,XGKQ} 
female:  eve, meg, susie, iris, tess, sue, vicki, bess, 
mimi, teri, keri, trixie 
 
male:  eric, curt, tim, mike, russ, kirk, merv, burt, 
steve, zeke, rick, emmet 
1b  (Figs. 3, S3, S4, 
S5, S14) 
 
{FJJF, JFFJ, FJFJ, 
JFJF} 
or 
NPPN, PNNP, 
NPNP, PNPN} 
vs. 
{DHHD, HDDH, 
DHDH, HDHD} 
or 
{LWWL,WLLW, 
LWLW, WLWL} 
female:  joan, donna, dawn, lola, polly, wanda, anna, 
hannah, holly, ann, nora, Wynona 
 
male: { john, jonah, andy, dan, alan, wally, noah, 
dylan, nolan, ladd, jay, donald} 
{BVVB,VBBV, 
BVBV,VBVB} 
or 
{MZZM, ZMMZ, 
MZMZ, ZMZM} 
vs. 
{GQQG, QGGQ, 
GQGQ, QGQG}  
or  
{KXXK,XKKX, 
KXKX, XKXK} 
female:  eve, meg, susie, iris, tess, sue, vicki, bess, 
mimi, teri, keri, trixie 
 
male:  eric, curt, tim, mike, russ, kirk, merv, burt, 
steve, zeke, rick, emmet 
 
1c (Figs. 5, S18); 
2a (Fig. 6);  2b 
(Fig..7); also Figs. 
S8, S9, S11, S12, 
S16 
NPLW 
vs. 
DHJF 
negative:  flaw, folly, flood, oaf, flop, old 
positive:  dandy, joy, play, happy, jolly, fond 
 
female:  joan, donna, lola, wanda, hannah, ann 
male:  john, dan, alan, wally, noah, donald 
BMVZ 
vs. 
GKQX 
negative:  miser, sick, bitter, bruise, crime, victim 
positive:  kiss, trust, true, cute, best, better 
 
female:  meg, susie, tess, sue, vicki, bess 
male:  eric, tim, mike, kirk, burt, steve 
Figs. S6, S15  
negative:  down, flaw, pall, jalopy, folly, flood, oaf, 
flop, plod, howl, old, wallop 
 
positive:  dandy, joy, play, happy, halo, pal, doll, 
dawn, opal, jolly, fond, panda 
BMVZ vs. GKQX 
or 
{BMVZ, MVZB, 
VZBM, ZBMV} 
vs. 
{GKQX, KQXG, 
QXGK, XGKQ} 
 
Fig. S10  
negative:  down, flaw, pall, jalopy, folly, flood, oaf, 
flop, plod, howl, old, wallop 
 
positive:  dandy, joy, play, happy, halo, pal, doll, 
dawn, opal, jolly, fond, panda 
BMVZ 
vs. 
GKQX 
 
Fig. S17 
NPLW 
vs. 
DHJF 
negative:  dood, haat, fataal, laf, waan, dof 
positive:  loyal, hoop, lof, top, loon, fan 
BMVZ 
vs. 
GKQX 
negative:  misbruik, ziek, virus, ruzie, smerig, crisis 
positive:  kus, succes, reis, muziek, zege, vers 
Table A2  Procedures for All Experiments 
Experi-
ment 
ID in 
article 
Experi-
ment ID 
in Sup-
plement 
Experi-
ment ID 
in 
archive 
CS–US 
interval 
Acquisi-
tion CS 
duration 
Condi-
tioning 
test CS 
duration 
Visibility 
test CS 
duration 
Acqui-
sition 
no.  of 
trials 
Condi-
tioning 
test no. 
of trials 
Visibility 
no. of 
test trials 
Contin-
gency 
aware-
ness test 
Experi-
ment 
year 
Total 
subject 
N 
Retained 
subject 
N  
US stimulih  
counter-
balan-
cing  
advance 
contingency 
information 
1a S1 3 75 75 25 25 240 144 144 none 2007 180 97i gender (A,B) j, k, n  
 S2 2 75 75 25 25 240 288 288 none 2006 78 47 i gender (A,B) j, k  
1b S3 4 75 75 25 25 120 72 72 none 2007 93 85 gender (A,B) j, k, n  
1b S4 4 75 25 75 75 120 72 72 none 2007 93 85 gender (A,B) j, k, n  
1b S5 4 75 25 25 25 120 72 72 none 2007 93 85 gender (A,B) j, k, n  
 S6 17b 75 33 33 33 336 144 192 none 2010 51 43 valence (A) j, k, n  
 S7 1 75 42 42 42 240 288 288 none 2006 113 73 i gender (A,B) j, k  
 S8 27 75 42a 42a 42a 120 96 144 after CT 2015 75 67 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, m, n specific 
 S9 27 75 42 42 42 120 96 144 after CT 2015 74 69 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, m, n specific 
 S10 18a 75 58 58 58 336 192 192 before CTf 2010 104 92 valence (A) j, k  
 S11 23b 75 58 58 58 250 96 96 
during ac-
quisitiong 
2011 56 53 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, m  
 S12 23c 75 58 58 58 250 96 96 
during ac-
quisitiong 
2012 89 82 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, m  
1a S13 3 75 75 75 75 240 144 144 none 2007 180 96 i gender (A,B) j, k, n  
1b S14 4 75 75 75 75 120 72 72 none 2007 93 85 gender (A,B) j, k, n  
 S15 17b 75 75 75 75 336 144 192 none 2010 64 51 valence (A) j, k, n  
 S16 24 US 75 75 75 75 250 96 96 none 2012 174 145 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, l, m  
 S17 24 Belg. 75 75 75 75 250 96 96 none 2013 32 32 
valence 
(A,B) 
j, k, l, m  
1c S18 26a+b+c 75 75 75 75 192 96 144 after CT 2014 386 350 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, l, m non-specifice 
2a(1)  25a 375 375 375 NA 250 96 NA before CT 2013 81 66 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, l, m  
  
 
 
  
 
2a(2)  25b 375 375 375 NA 250 96 NA before CT 2013 58 46 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, l, m specific 
2a(3)  25c 375 83b 83b NA 250 96 NA before CT 2013 109 101 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, l, m  
2b(1)  26a 375 375 375 NA 168 96 NA after CT 2014 85 73 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, l, m non-specific 
2b(2)  26b 375 75c 75c NA 168 96 NA after CT 2014 99 92 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, l, m  
2b(3)  26c 375 75d 75d NA 168 96 NA after CT 2014 193 172 
gender 
(A,B), 
valence(A.B) 
j, k, l, m  
Notes for Table 2 
a Expt. S8: A 33ms mask preceded the CS, making the CS–US interval 42 ms, different from the 75-ms interval between CS onset and US in all other experiments. 
b Expt. 2a(3): A 292-ms backward mask followed the 83-ms CS.  Because there was no forward mask, the CS was visible. 
c Expt. 2b(2):A 300-ms blank screen followed the 75-ms CS. 
d Expt. 2b(3): A 100-ms backward mask, followed by 200-ms blank screen, followed the 75-ms CS. 
e 
Expt. 1c: No contingency information was provided to the last 75% of Ss.  Because the contingency information had no effect, all subjects were combined for reported 
analyses. 
f Expt. S10: The contingency awareness test was used for a special purpose, described in the General Discussion. 
g Expt. S11 & Expt. S12: The contingency awareness test was administered between the 3rd and 4th (of 5) acquisition trial blocks. 
h Letters in parentheses indicate sub-alphabets used in each experiment, and whether the experiment used only gender USs, only valence USs, or both. 
i High subject exclusion rates because of a programming error in the visibility test, which rendered that procedure’s data unusable for a large fraction of subjects.   
j Counterbalancing of sub-alphabet used for CS vs US 
k Counterbalanced assignments of specific letters within sub-alphabet s to CSs associated with each US category 
l Counterbalanced assignment of left key to female or unpleasant vs. male or pleasant  
m Counterbalanced assignment of subjects to gender vs. valence USs 
n CS durations in acquisition and/or test crossed with stimulus assignment variations 
